Fuat Önen posted on February 03, 2025 at 01:14 – an interview
– My guest is Fuat Önen, welcome mentor.
– Thank you, I appreciate the invitation. I hope it will be a productive broadcast for the people of Kurdistan.
– Thank you, and thank you for participating.
During this resolution process, what was President Erdoğan’s advisor Mehmet Uçum saying? He says, “There is no Kurdish issue.” That is, in the North, “There is no Kurdish issue in Turkey. Some imperialists and some circles abroad are provoking it. It is a foreign matter,” he says. Therefore, he implies that we have closed the chapter on the Kurdish issue. He even goes so far as to say that they don’t have much power in the North anyway, but in Rojava they have a force of 100,000. That is our main target, they say.
Öcalan says: “As Turkey democratizes, the Kurdish issue will be resolved through peaceful and democratic methods.” So, what is this process really about? Is Turkey truly democratizing?
– Now, we can discuss the Turkish state’s relationship with its own society. That is, we can discuss the relationship between the Turkish state and the society living in the western part of Kurdistan, the geography we call Turkey. Here, it can be debated whether this state is democratic or not. And we can also discuss the presence of the Republic of Turkey in Kurdistan.
We can discuss the relationship between the Kurdish society and the Turkish state. There is no room for democracy here. The Turkish state is an occupying state in Kurdistan. Its century-long practice is also genocidal. Because the fundamental paradigm of this republic is nation-building. What they call ‘Nation-building’ is the construction of a nation. When the Republic of Turkey was established, there was no nation within the borders of this state. The Turkish nation has never historically existed in this geography anyway. Some ethnically Turkish groups came. They established some principalities. Then it became an empire. Therefore, the fundamental issue in front of the state was to create a nation for this state.
Since there were multiple nations and country realities within the sovereignty of the state, the only way to create a single nation from this collection was through genocide. That’s why short-term genocide was first applied to the Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrians. Since the Kurds had a national and territorial reality that could not be eradicated through short-term genocide, they implemented a prolonged genocide against the Kurds. This is the century-long practice of this state in Kurdistan.
Now, democracy cannot emerge from this! Democracy is not a concept that defines the relationship between two nations. Democracy is a concept that describes the relationship between a state and its own society. Therefore, a democratic relationship between Kurds and Turks, between the Kurdish nation and the Turkish state, contradicts the very notion of the word. Such a definition is not valid. The presence of this state in Kurdistan is that of an occupier and has a genocidal practice. As long as this continues, it is not possible for this state to establish a democratic relationship with its own society either. Because occupation and genocidal practices also poison Turkish society itself.
The state must produce consent from Turkish society for all the massacres it commits in Kurdistan, and it has been doing so for a century. Now, a society that consents to occupation cannot democratize. That is why, especially when we discuss this with revolutionary friends from Turkey, we say: If you want democratization in Turkey, this state must withdraw from Kurdistan.
As long as this state continues its occupation in Kurdistan, it is not possible for it to establish a democratic system within its own society. Therefore, to debate the Kurdistan issue in terms of the level of progress or regression of democracy in Turkey is to deny the reality of Kurdistan. The aim of our national liberation struggle in Kurdistan is not to democratize Turkey, but to carry out a national democratic revolution in Kurdistan and to build a democratic state there.
This is also important in another respect: For the past four months, we have been experiencing a strangeness that we can call the Bahçeli–Öcalan initiative or process. Now, it is important to think about ‘deviations’. It opens the mind. It allows us to penetrate deeper into the facts. This process began with two deviations.
The first deviation: In October, when Erdoğan was speaking at the opening of the Turkish Parliament, he said that Israel’s next target after Lebanon is our country. At that time, no ceasefire had yet been signed in Lebanon and the Syrian regime had not yet collapsed. Now, we need to analyze this statement.
Turkey is a NATO state. Israel is America in the Middle East, even NATO in the Middle East. Under these conditions, it is impossible for Israel to attack Turkey. NATO has Article 5, for example. And there were no statements anywhere that could substantiate this claim.
So why did this deviation occur? Or why did the President of the Turkish State make this statement contrary to the truth? What did he mean?
The very next sentence was a call to strengthen the domestic front. That is, he said Israel will attack us, so let’s strengthen our internal front.
Normally, if a head of state believes another state will attack them, this leads to panic among the public, preparations, or a surge in defensive enthusiasm. All political parties in that country would try to form a united front. None of that happened, because no one believed it.
So what was the reason? What was the threat Erdoğan was referring to?
The threat was this: since the Gaza war began, it has been said that this war may show a tendency to expand. First Gaza, then Lebanon, then Syria. Israel fought with six different states simultaneously: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen. Therefore, the stabilization of Syria was also a possibility—a strong one.
Because while the war continued, Israel constantly bombed the presence of Hezbollah and Iranian militias in Syria. And Erdoğan, or the Turkish state, thought this: if stabilization occurs in Syria as well, if Assad goes, then the most organized, militant, and armed segment within the borders of the Syrian state is the Kurdish segment. They could form a state. Or they could gain a federal/confederal status. What Erdoğan referred to as an Israeli threat was essentially this. That was the first deviation.
There is only one issue the Turkish state sees as a matter of survival: the statehood of Kurdistan.
Because if the Kurds establish a state, the hundred-year-old “nation-building project” will collapse. And that is the very reason for the existence of this republic—to build a nation. The only obstacle to this is the reality of the Kurdish nation and homeland.
Now to the second deviation:
About a week to ten days later, the fascist party of Turkey, which is hostile to Kurds and Kurdistan—the MHP—and its fascist chairman invited Öcalan to speak in parliament. In exchange for the “right to hope.” That is, the same Öcalan whom they have called a terrorist leader and baby killer, they invited to speak in the DEM group in parliament. What he said in return was that the only thing to be given was the right to hope. This is the second deviation. Even the last party in Turkey that could undertake such an initiative would not be the MHP. It is a party that bases all its politics on hostility toward Kurds and Kurdistan. So why did they say this?
From this, we understand that the potential statehood of Kurdistan has not only disturbed the AKP-MHP, but also the state mind behind them. The reasons for their unease are as follows: Since 1990—and especially since 2003—the federal structure in Southern Kurdistan has already put the Turkish state in a difficult position.
Added to that is what we call Little South, which is not actually Western Kurdistan, but the Little South. That is, in the south of Kurdistan, we have two parts: one centered around Hewlêr (Erbil), and the other around Qamishli.
If this second part moves toward statehood—and even if the possibility of unification between the two lies beyond the current political class’s horizon—it still poses a serious threat to the Turkish state. So what should be done? Then, they need to call the Kurds to the internal front. When they say, “Let’s strengthen the internal front,” by the nature of political logic, the call was not made to the CHP, but through Öcalan, to DEM. Because we’ve seen over the past four months that the MHP-AKP government is also exerting certain pressures on the CHP. If there was really a need for an internal front, they should have had better relations with CHP. Therefore, this call is a call to rally the Kurds to the internal front via Öcalan. This time, not just the Kurds of Northwestern Kurdistan, but also both parts of Southern Kurdistan are being called to this internal front.
And now we come to the deviation in Kurdish politics.
Normally, Kurdistan and Kurdish politics are not part of the internal front of the Turkish state or politics. We are not inside Turkey. Turkey is inside Kurdistan. And Turkey exists within Kurdistan as an occupying state. Under normal circumstances, those who claim to conduct Kurdish politics should reject this call. We are not components of the Turkish state or its internal front. This state is an occupier within us.
For a normal dialogue to occur, first, they should say: “The Turkish state must withdraw from Kurdistan, and recognize the Kurdish people’s national and territorial reality.” According to the normal course of political logic, those claiming to conduct politics on behalf of Kurds should not be the addressees of this call. Because there is no peace process underway. The MHP leader is yelling at Öcalan as if giving orders—come here, dissolve your organization, disband your armed force. This is not a call for dialogue. There is no negotiation table. The fascist leader of the MHP is giving orders to Öcalan. But behold, our political class in Northwestern Kurdistan has become so degenerate, so detached from revolutionary spirit, that they are lining up to respond to this fascist call.
First, Sırrı Süreyya Önder thanked Bahçeli. Then Selahattin Demirtaş thanked him. Then Öcalan thanked him. And then, so-called Kurdish political parties that claim to speak for the Kurds lined up. Most of the Kurdish parties outside of DEM began saying, “Include us as well. A table cannot be formed without us. Don’t proceed with just DEM. Take us too.” This is also a deviation in Kurdish politics.
That is, there is no real call to be addressed! What are the other slogans of Erdoğan and the MHP leader? It is: “A Turkey without terrorism.” So, is there terrorism in Turkey?
From 2016 to 2025, over the last 9 years, the PKK has carried out only 3 armed actions in Turkey: one in Mersin and two in Ankara. In these actions, 6 PKK militants were killed. In the latest TUSAŞ attack, 6–7 TUSAŞ personnel were killed. To look at these 3 actions over 9 years and say there is terrorism in Turkey is illogical. In every country in the world, three such actions would occur in nine months. So where is the terrorism? The Turkish state produces terrorism in three parts of Kurdistan: Northwestern Kurdistan, Central Southern Kurdistan, and the Little South.
So, is there any indication in this initiative by the Turkish state that it will end this terrorism? No, there is not. There is no such environment. The PKK is not conducting an armed struggle in Turkey that puts the Turkish state in difficulty! But Turkey is conducting an occupation movement in three parts of Kurdistan.
So, are those addressed by this call able to say this? You are telling the PKK to disarm. Are you going to end your occupation violence or terrorism in the three parts of Kurdistan? No, you first stop.
Yes, you first withdraw from Afrin, Serêkaniyê, and Girê Spî! Dismantle the 60–70 military outposts you’ve established in Southern Kurdistan and Central Southern Kurdistan! If your demand is truly for a nonviolent environment, then first give these up!
Then stop subjecting Little South to continuous bombardment through the so-called mine-donkeys of the SMO (Syrian National Army); put an end to the terror you perpetuate in Little South through these SMO militants. That’s not happening either! And those who claim to be interlocutors make no such demand! They merely say: “Open the way for Öcalan, he will solve these issues.”
Now the fundamental question is: “At the end of 2024, was there any advanced struggle in Turkey or Northwestern Kurdistan that put the Turkish State in a difficult position?” No, there was not! That is, internally, we had no deterrence that could force the state into such actions.
So what do we understand from this?
The reasons for this so-called opening — the Bahçeli-Öcalan opening — do not lie within the Turkish state’s internal borders. This is directly an external issue. Because we do not have internal leverage to compel them to do this.
It’s not as if we forced them and so they opened up! Therefore, the key dynamic is external. And where is this “outside”? It is Little South, and the potential there for statehood, or a federal/confederal structure following the collapse of the Assad regime.
So what is being proposed to counter that?
We can understand this from two statements by Sırrı Süreyya Önder and Öcalan. Öcalan says:
“Imperialism has ambitions over Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. I am working on a model that will close the door to imperialism.”
But no one is asking: these four states have more than a million armed forces. These four states have countless universities, academics. If they have a problem with imperialism, they can formulate their own model.
And why is this your concern anyway? What about the imperialist ambitions of these four states over Kurdistan?
In fact, Turkey and Iran are sub-imperialist regional powers.
Before its defeat in the war with Israel, Iran had a military presence in six countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine. Iran is an imperial power.
Turkey is an imperialist state with military presence in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Bosnia, and Azerbaijan — actively participating in these wars and especially aiming for expansion in neighboring regions.
So while your own land is under imperialist occupation and aggression, how can you talk about closing the door to supposed imperialist ambitions of these four states?
Why is this a concern for you? And strangely, neither the Kurdish people nor Kurdish politics — especially in Northwestern Kurdistan — are reacting seriously to this. On the contrary, everyone is waiting like they’re expecting Godot: “Let’s see what Öcalan will say on February 15.”
Öcalan has been on İmralı Island for twenty-six years, and this is, by my count, his fifth major statement. I’ll briefly address each and finish.
First Statement:
After being captured, he ordered all armed forces to withdraw from within the borders of the Turkish state. He issued an order: all armed forces are to withdraw from Northwestern Kurdistan and from Turkey if present.
This decision was contrary to the natural flow of political life — a deviation. Because normally, when the leader of a fighting organization is captured, the organization escalates the fight.
At that time, there was a spirit and effort of escalation both among the people and the fighters. Dozens of people burned themselves in protest. That was the outward expression of that spirit.
But Öcalan is not merely a leader of the PKK — they refer to him as “leadership,” not simply “leader.” This means Öcalan is not within the PKK; the PKK is within Öcalan. Because of this, the PKK followed this irrational decision. Hundreds of fighters were killed just because they retreated.
Selim Çürükkaya says that number is around 930 people, but I’ll say hundreds at least.
Normally, for such a withdrawal, two sides agree: one side doesn’t attack, and the other retreats. That didn’t happen. Öcalan said “retreat,” and they did. It’s said that some who refused were killed by the PKK itself. This first statement was against the natural course of political life. No one questioned it. Even the families of the hundreds of Kurdish youths killed didn’t question it.
You could say, “Okay, they died in war, they were martyrs,” and people would understand that. But there was no war at the time. You say, “Withdraw,” and they withdraw. The Turkish state kills hundreds of them.
Second Statement – the İmralı Opening (2004):
Between 1999 and 2004, when you read Öcalan’s and the PKK’s texts, there’s only one message: “The armed struggle has expired. Violence is the mother of all evil.”
While this trajectory continued, in 2004 — from İmralı prison, under the strict control of the military — through Mahmut Şakar, a decision was passed to Kandil to resume armed struggle.
Again, not normal. Nothing to do with the usual political flow. A man who, since capture, surrendered to the state and never defended his cause or organization — now, after five years of pacifism, calls for armed struggle. This is another deviation.
Third Statement – Oslo Talks moved to İmralı:
Until 2007–2008, İmralı was under General Staff control. At that time, AKP claimed that the 2004 decision for armed struggle was imposed on the PKK by the military to fight against the AKP.
In 2007–2008, a regulation transferred İmralı’s control from the General Staff to the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Simultaneously, talks were happening in Oslo with a third-party state acting as guarantor or observer.
Öcalan had those talks transferred to İmralı. But the leadership outside was more in touch with reality and more knowledgeable about their forces. Why move the process to İmralı instead of continuing in Oslo? This was the third deviation.
Fourth Statement – The 2012 Opening:
In summer 2012, PKK declared territorial control in Şemdinli. At the same time, prison resistance began with thousands of detainees. Hunger strikes, death fasts spread throughout Kurdistan. The PKK was on the offensive. Also, the Syrian war had begun in 2011.
Suddenly, Öcalan came back into the picture: “End the control zones! Stop the prison resistance! We will solve this on İmralı.”
The document of the solution? The 2013 Newroz declaration. It invoked the spirit of Çanakkale, the War of Independence, and Islamic Brotherhood — all ideological elements hostile to the Kurdish revolution.
Again, contrary to the normal course of political life. And the fifth instance is what we’ve already discussed.
All of these are contrary to rational political behavior. Öcalan is inside, and since capture, has neither defended his cause nor his party. Giving such a person the role of national representative is irrational. Kurdish politics — especially families who lost children in this war — must object.
This distortion stems from calling someone your will, when they have no will of their own.
So, this last “opening” is in fact an attack on Kurdistan. This time, not just Northwestern Kurdistan, but the focus is Little South Kurdistan. And alongside it, Southern Kurdistan is also a target.
We must recognize that. Because the 70–80 military outposts Turkey established in Southern Kurdistan are not because of the PKK. They aim to dismantle and control the existing structure in Southern Kurdistan.
Iraq will be one of the flashpoints of future war. Iran’s resistance front — or the so-called Shia Crescent — runs from Tehran, through Baghdad and Damascus, to Palestine and Yemen. Three of its key positions have collapsed: Palestine, Lebanon, Syria.
For now, Iraq remains between Israel and Iran. War will intensify there. Second, the war in Syria will continue for the next decade. We’ll return to that in more detail.
The Turkish State has an expansionist project targeting all parts of Kurdistan. Öcalan, in this context, is nothing more than an instrument to be used by the Turkish State.
– Yes, and let me add one more observation to the points you’ve just outlined:
In the spring of 2015, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, representing Abdullah Öcalan and authorized by him, initiated the Trench War (Hendek Savaşı) — much like Mahmut Şakar did.
This war emerged from within, under the supervision and approval of the Turkish State. As a result, the Northern front was closed to guerrilla forces.
– Sırrı Süreyya Önder was declared the Honorary President of the KCK by Öcalan on İmralı. The KCK is considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish State. People who merely greet the KCK from a distance spend years in prison. Yet the Honorary President of the KCK is now Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Parliament.
Sırrı Süreyya Önder himself said in an interview with İsmail Saymaz: “Between 2012 and 2015, I did not serve a party duty. I performed a state duty.”
Currently, the second in line after the President is the Speaker of Parliament. Sırrı Süreyya Önder is the Deputy Speaker of Parliament. And he is at the head of the delegation between Bahçeli and Öcalan. Alongside him is also Pervin Buldan.
They brought in Ahmet Türk, then sidelined him. Therefore, those being invited to the Turkish state’s internal front are being called by figures embedded into Kurdish politics by the Turkish state.
– Professor, he’s been declared the official representative of this nonexistent process — meaning this nonexistent peace. He’s been authorized externally to speak on someone’s behalf. Then, we saw the same pattern again. Today Netanyahu made a statement while on his way to the U.S.:
“We changed the map in the Middle East. Along with our partners, we will continue changing the map further.” That was his message.
Colani held a victory conference. Colani was declared President. They rewrote the constitution, the electoral system — everything was taken over.
The Autonomous Administration said: “Our will is not present here. We are not participating in this, nor do we consider it right.”
That’s why they entered a formal objection. They said: “We are not part of this government. We are not represented. Therefore, we are not signing under such a decision.”
Now about Rojava and what we can gather from Netanyahu’s statement: Everyone already says, “The map will change, and it seems it will continue to change.” What’s your view on this? Will we be able to guarantee Rojava’s future?
– First of all, the demand to change political borders in the Middle East and Near East is our demand.
When the United States, Israel, the Soviet Union, and all the world powers were defending existing political borders, we were the ones against those borders. We said those borders were imperialist, colonialist lines. The demand to change those borders is ours.
Let’s make this clear. Because Kurdish politics is being accused of being an instrument of imperialism on this basis. These claims are irrational. In the region — especially in the Near East but also the Middle East — none of the existing political borders align with historical and social realities.
The abolition of all these borders, which do not match historical and social realities, and the redrawing of new borders that reflect the historical and social truth of the peoples of the region, is a revolutionary duty.
For fifty years — and even for the past hundred years — Kurdish politics has struggled to change these borders. Right now, there are five state borders that run through Kurdistan. These borders are daggers stabbed into Kurdistan’s heart.
The goal of our revolutionary struggle is to eliminate these borders. That’s the first point.
Second, the current political borders were drawn by imperialists in the first place. In the Middle East, it’s mostly the Sykes-Picot borders. In the Near East, it’s the political borders based on the Lausanne Treaty.
Anyone sanctifying current political borders is not a revolutionary but a collaborator of imperialism. Because these current borders were drawn by imperialists themselves.
Now, if in 2025 some other imperialists are changing — or trying to change — the borders drawn by British and French imperialists, this signals a conflict among imperialists. We’re not on either side of that.
We’ve been saying all along that these borders must be changed. That’s been the goal of our century-long struggle. In fact, it’s been the goal of 150 years, since Sheikh Ubeydullah Nehri’s uprising in 1870. Kurdistani politics has been striving to change these political borders.
What does Israel mean by this? On which issues will they agree with Trump? If they agree, will Britain support it? Will the EU back it? What will China, Russia, India, and Japan say? These are questions for the coming days.
So far, there is no clear or concrete development. But we can say this:
Since the 1990s, Israel has acted more and more like an imperial power in the region — as an expansionist force. They have such projects. This is the continuation of the Third World War in the Middle and Near East.
Those who accuse Kurdish/Kurdistani politics of being tools of imperialism for supporting border change are themselves tools of imperialism.
Öcalan, who claims to be closing the door on imperialist ambitions over these four states, is in fact acting as a subcontractor for the current imperialist status quo. Because we’ve been fighting for 150 years to change these borders — and we will continue to do so for another hundred years if necessary.
Because for the Kurds to normalize as a people, as a nation, the abolition of these occupying state borders is essential.
Here’s what is being imposed on us today:
We are being told to tell the people of Nusaybin: “You must live with those in Edirne and Tokat. But whatever you do, don’t even think about living with Kurds in Qamishli!”
We are told to say to the people of Şırnak: “Learn to live with people in Konya and Çorum. That is democracy. But don’t even dream of living with the people of Duhok!”
This is Öcalan’s model.
Our model, first and foremost, is that the people of Kurdistan should live together.
First, the people of Kurdistan must attain the legal right to live together, and this must take concrete form through statehood. Only then can we become a normal nation and pursue civilized relations with our neighbors. But currently, our neighbors are not civilized.
Colonialism, occupation, and genocidal policies prevent the establishment of civilized relationships.
If anything is to be prevented, it should be these occupying relations. That’s all I have to say on Netanyahu’s statement — except for one important point I should add:
There is a corridor known by Turks as the “David Corridor” and by Kurds as the “Saladin Corridor.”
This is a new energy route starting from both parts of Southern Kurdistan, stretching through Syria, Iraq, and Jordan to Israel, and then reaching the Mediterranean.
It is an energy corridor. It is known that there are two major energy corridor projects globally and regionally: China’s Silk Road and India’s Spice Road.
A key reason behind the wars in the world and in the region is the struggle to control energy resources and energy routes. This corridor is important for Kurds.
That’s why I say: both parts of Southern Kurdistan must unite and take control of this energy corridor.
If this energy corridor can be controlled, it will open a gateway for both parts of Kurdistan to the world. That is, in Southern Kurdistan and Little South, Kurds will be able to export their oil and natural gas through this corridor.
That’s what the Turkish State is calculating. To block this, they created the Development Road Project together with Iraq — and they are not allowing it to pass through Southern Kurdistan.
This Development Road will go directly from Iraq to Turkey along the border.
The real reason why the Turkish State is bothered by the presence of armed forces in that area is this: an energy corridor requires security. There must be no armed force against you there.
– Recently, Mazlum Abdi has made many statements. In fact, someone like Mazlum Abdi should not speak so frequently. He is a significant Kurdish commander who led a serious partisan war against ISIS.
His latest statement against Damascus — the latest statement from the SDF — is extremely appropriate and correct. Its correctness lies in this: “This is not legitimate,” he says. Yes, any decision made at a meeting in Damascus regarding Little South Kurdistan is not legitimate.
There is no legitimate government in Damascus. HTS and its leader Colani are cadres who came from Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Jabhat al-Nusra. Most of these cadres came to Syria from outside — they are Afghans, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, or so-called mujahideen from those regions or from Europe. In our eyes, they are aggressive terrorists. This is what HTS is. Any decision they make regarding Kurdistan is illegitimate.
Secondly, at this conference, Colani was declared head of state. They abolished the constitution. Last month, or at the beginning of January, Colani made some of these foreign militants generals, some colonels, and some even ministers.
These groups, along with Turkey, insist that PKK cadres in Little South Kurdistan must leave. But our side — let’s speak via Mazlum Abdi — cannot say the following:
“You’ve made foreign fighters who have nothing to do with Syria into generals, colonels, and ministers. Ours are not foreign — they either came from Northern Kurdistan or another part of Southern Kurdistan. You have no right to make such a demand of us.”
Instead, Mazlum Abdi says: “These comrades came and helped. If a ceasefire happens, they will leave anyway.” Fine, let them leave. If they have no work to do there, they can leave. But if someone must send them away, it should be your decision.
Turkey, or Golani — who has killed thousands of Kurds — has no right to make such a demand of you. First, trust in your own strength. Take a proper national stance based on the reality of your nation and land. I mean, who are Bahçeli and Colani to call the Kurds there foreigners, and then make terrorists from Kazakhstan, Tatarstan, and other places generals, colonels, and ministers?
I say this because: Kurdish politics must be self-confident. Kurdistan has enormous potential.
The people of Kurdistan have fought heroically and selflessly against invaders for centuries. We must rely on this and think with a broader perspective. Raise the bar. Later, if negotiations happen, you may give three and take five. Do what you will. But first, take a national stance. Reject these immoral offers.
Another recent statement from Mazlum Abdi — also concerning the Bahçeli–Öcalan initiative — is particularly troubling:
He says: “Öcalan will probably speak on February 15. The PKK and Turkey will make peace. In that case, Turkey won’t attack us.”
He still thinks Turkey’s problem is the presence of PKK members there. It’s not. Turkey’s problem is the formation of a Kurdish political structure there and the possibility of unification with Southern Kurdistan. That is Turkey’s true concern. Whether there are PKK members or not is just an excuse, a pretext.
Therefore, Mazlum Abdi must be more aware of this.
Likewise, his meeting with Mesut Barzani created hope among all Kurds. Everyone said that although this meeting should have happened long ago, it’s still a good thing. I agree.
Because, first and foremost, Kurds need to talk to each other. They need to learn to live together.
But even then, he reportedly said to Kek Mesud: “Please improve our relations with Turkey.”
Now that’s not acceptable. You represent Little South. He represents Central South Kurdistan. If there is an attack against either of you from Turkey or elsewhere, you must fight together.
I don’t think Mesut Barzani should act as a mediator like he did during the 2009–2015 so-called İmralı peace process. Diplomatic support is a different matter.
There is Nechirvan Barzani, Masrour Barzani. They have relations with many global powers. They can use these relations to help.
Kek Mesud’s statement is important:
“We are ready to assist Little South (Rojava) in any way — even militarily, if necessary.”
This is significant. The key point here is that we currently have 300,000 fighters. Having an army of 300,000 in this region is critical. But our army is divided into three. It is not a national army, but party armies. YNK has one, PDK has another, and PYD has a third.
So the most urgent problem in Kurdish politics is to form a unified army and reach a unified political mindset. Therefore, when General Mazlum and President Barzani met, they should have talked about these issues.
Are there any other issues we missed?
Also, I had mentioned the Syrian National Army (SNA). The Syrian National Army is a paramilitary structure dependent on Turkey. It does not represent the Syrian people. Despite its name, it is not a national force. It is an unnational force — because it was established, organized, and directed by another state.
Secondly, this army’s only target is Kurdistan. It has never fought Assad. It has never fought ISIS. It has only fought Kurds.
It is a tool used by the Turkish State. That’s why our brothers in Little South must carefully consider what they mean when they talk about “integrating into Syria.”
There is no system in Syria to integrate into! And in my opinion, there never will be.
If a Syrian nation could have been built, Baas would have done it. It was secular and nationalist. They could have built a Syrian nation, but they failed.
Now, HTS and Colani — fanatical, sectarian, violent forces with blood on their hands — cannot build a Syrian nation either. We must not approach this with “democratic nation” fantasies.
There is no such thing as a democratic nation. Democracy is a condition of states, not nations.
We can debate whether a state is democratic, but not whether a nation is. Every nation includes both pro-democracy and anti-democracy elements.
Therefore, HTS and Colani cannot generate consent from Kurds, Druze, Alawite Arabs, Armenians, or Assyrians.
They should not feel close to peace. What must be done now is, especially, to establish good relations with the Southern Kurdistan administration and prepare seriously for war.
Because on one side we have the SNA, backed by Turkey, constantly attacking Kurdistan.
On the other side, we know the character of the regime in Damascus — an anti-civilization political mindset. From here, no unified Syria will emerge.
The fate of Syria in the coming years will be an intensification of war.
– That’s all, mentor. Thank you very much.
– I thank you. I send my respects to all the people of Kurdistan.
I will just say this: Kurdistani politicians must renew the goal of an Independent and United Kurdistan every day within themselves.
This is not a position against seeking federal or autonomous status in one part or another.
But regardless of any tactical victories won, the permanent solution to the Kurdish issue lies in an Independent, United Kurdistan. Thank you. I hope it was a good program.
– Thank you. Dear viewers, we’ve come to the end of another program. Don’t forget to subscribe to the channel and like the video.
Wishing you all a pleasant evening.
– Sending my respects and love.
welat_TV Dursun Ali Küçük
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