Interview: Fuat Önen posted on November 11, 2024,
Why has a new ‘solution process’ been needed in Turkey? Could the current international context and, especially, recent developments in the Middle East, along with the tension between Israel and Iran, have paved the way for this move? In this new context, does Bahçeli’s statement and the possibility of restarting a ‘solution process’ have any resonance in the Kurdish community?
First, it’s not accurate to think that there was a solution process in the past and this is just a new one. Neither the talks between 2009-2015 nor the discussions Bahçeli mentioned and Erdoğan approved signal a solution process.
For a solution process to be discussed, the parties must recognize each other. On one side, there is the Turkish state; so, who is on the other side? The Kurdish community recognizes the existence of the Turkish state and the Turkish national existence that emerged in western Kurdistan. However, this state does not recognize either the Kurdish national reality or the reality of Kurdistan. Unilateral recognition is a form of slavery. Masters do not recognize their slaves; but slaves recognize their masters.
Therefore, neither the discussions held in the past nor the current processes – which could be called the Imralı or Bahçeli process, rather than a solution process – can be considered a solution process. We could talk about inviting Kurdish politics to slavery.
The conflict environment in the world and the increasingly intense conflict expected in the Near East are actually one of the fronts of the Third World War that has been ongoing for about 30 years in our region. These discussions started when Erdoğan, in his speech at the opening of the parliament, said, “After Lebanon, Israel’s target is Turkey.”
Normally, when the president of a state, who is also the commander-in-chief, states that another state threatens them, this declaration would provoke a debate, turmoil, or a reaction among the masses and political groups of that country.
However, Erdoğan’s statements did not provoke such a reaction. Because the reality is that Israel is not going to attack Turkey or eye its territory. So, what is actually at stake? To put it simply: If the United States allows Israel to escalate the attack and expand the war, a threat towards Syria could emerge after Lebanon. The Turkish state believes that if the state in Syria collapses and Damascus weakens, there are 60-70 thousand armed Kurdish forces there. They believe that the development of Kurdish statuses in Rojava, the so-called Small South, will lead to them eventually forming a state. Therefore, what Erdoğan refers to as the “Israeli threat” is not Israel threatening Turkey, but the possibility of the Kurds establishing a state in the new conflicts in the region. This is an existential issue for the Turkish state, which they have been emphasizing for years. From this, we understand that the Turkish state’s existential issue is not an Israeli attack on Turkey, but rather the formation of a Kurdish state if the war expands.
What was done in response to this? Bahçeli said in his group speech, “Öcalan should come and say that he has dissolved his party and disbanded his armed forces, and then let’s give him the right to hope.” Here, Bahçeli is not talking about solving any problems or negotiating the issues that are referred to as the Kurdish problem. He is almost giving an order to Öcalan: “Come, dissolve your party, disband your military forces, and we will give you the right to hope.” Now, individual demands, like those raised later by the DEM Party and other parties named after Kurds and Kurdistan, were put forward. For example, they talked about granting the right to hope to prisoners who had been in prison for a long time, and also discussed taking steps on the Kurdish language. However, the demands of the Kurdish nation, the rights derived from being a nation, were not voiced. From this, I understand that the Turkish state is starting a new attack on Kurdish politics and possibly on Kurdistan. Initially, this is a political attack, but if they cannot subdue Kurdish politics, it may turn into a military attack, especially in Northwest Kurdistan, South Kurdistan, and Small South Kurdistan. Those who claim to represent the Kurds and make national demands might face such an attack. This is not a process that will unfold overnight. From what I see, there is a state logic behind it, and what they are essentially saying is: “Kurdish and Turkish politics need to support the Turkish state in this Third World War.” This is the essence. Just like during and after the First World War, until 1923, Kurdish intellectuals, politicians, and tribal leaders stood by the Ottoman Empire and the caliphate. For example, Cibranlı Halit Bey served in the Ottoman army and in the Republican army until 1924. Yusuf Ziya Bey supported both the Ottomans and Kemalists in the First Assembly. Mehmet Emin Zeki Bey fought in the Ottoman ranks. However, after the Treaty of Lausanne, they realized that the issue was not defending the caliphate but keeping the largest part of the divided Kurdistan under occupation by the newly established state.
In the Third World War, the Turkish state is again inviting Kurdish politics to support it, offering some minor concessions, like blue beads, and calling them to the internal front. Because this was the message at the beginning of Erdoğan’s speech: “Our state is under threat, we need to strengthen the internal front.” This has no resonance in Kurdish politics. Because Kurdish politics is not on the internal front of the Turkish state. On the contrary, it is on the opposite front of the internal front they have created or will create.
U.S. ELECTIONS WILL BE IMPORTANT
When we look at the past solutions, we see that the Turkish state never confronted the Kurds as a nation in the search for solutions. How do you think if the search for solutions is approached in the same way again, it will affect the outcome?
This would only allow the Turkish state to catch its breath. As I said, there is no solution process here. As long as the truth of the Turkish nation and the truth of Kurdistan are not recognized, every kind of negotiation is a master-slave negotiation. Therefore, no solution process will emerge from this. This time, the political attack is not limited to Northwest Kurdistan. Especially, the primary target is the Small South or the region we call Rojava. Because their main fear is that, just like in South Kurdistan, a semi-state structure might emerge in the Small South and eventually, the Small South and South Kurdistan could unite.
They offer two options to the Small South, i.e., Rojava: Either they join Assad’s army, meaning they surrender to Assad, or if this is not possible, they accept the protection of the Turkish state. This is not a short-term issue; it will unfold over time. In this process, the U.S. elections will be important. Because from what I understand, the Turkish state logic thinks: “Either agree with Russia, Iran, and Syria, eliminate the status in Small South, and integrate them into the Syrian order, or if an agreement with Assad is not possible, if Trump wins the U.S. elections and U.S. troops withdraw, the Turkish state can step in to fill the gap. In that case, the option of ‘we will protect you’ will be offered to the Small South.” The Turkish state has not made a final decision on this yet. Because these moves were not made based on the dynamics of Turkey and Northwest Kurdistan. They were made as a step against the escalation of the war in the Near East and the Middle East in the Third World War. Therefore, Turkey’s stance could change depending on the developments in the region.
LEGAL KURDISH POLITICS HAS FAILED A BAD EXAM
Recently, the appointed trustee of the municipality of Esenyurt, Van, who was selected by the CHP and DEM Party for the city agreement, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Özer, was replaced and Özer was arrested and sent to prison. Now, trustees have been appointed to the municipalities of Mardin, Batman, and Halfeti. How do you think these new trustee appointments will affect a potential ‘solution process’?
This will not directly affect it because this new attack will involve such localized and expanding attacks. Those who expected a straight line have either quickly realized or will soon realize that they were mistaken. Legal Kurdish politics in Northwest Kurdistan has failed a bad exam. They lined up one by one, saying “we are the interlocutors, we are the interlocutors, take us seriously,” without any framework drawn by the state. However, this is not an issue like that. If this becomes a political and later military attack by the Turkish state, we shouldn’t be surprised by such moves. The sign was clear; after the Ankara explosion, 32 targets in Small South were bombed overnight. Bombings have continued ever since. Bombings are still happening in South Kurdistan as well. The message is: “Either you act the way we say or we will fight.”
The response that should be given against this, from a Kurdish political perspective, should be: “The Turkish state is trying to strengthen its internal front; we are not its interlocutors. The interlocutors would be the CHP.” Kurdish political actors should have started strengthening their own internal front. A strengthened internal front in Turkey is a threat to us. Against this threat, Kurdish politics should have strengthened its own internal front.
For instance, in Southwestern Kurdistan, we have 200,000 armed forces; in Small South, there are 60-70 thousand armed forces. If we include the Kurdish forces in Eastern Kurdistan and the North, we have 300,000 armed forces in Kurdistan. With the right leadership, it wouldn’t be difficult to increase this number to 500,000 or even 1 million. The important thing is for Kurdish political actors to approach politics from the perspective of war. Just as war is conducted with the harshest means of politics, they should understand this and assess the situation accordingly. Our expectation is that a national government should be established in South Kurdistan as soon as possible. The parliament should discuss threats to Kurdistan and call for strengthening the internal front against these threats. In Small South, PYD, YPG, Mazlum Kobani, and other Kurdish organizations should urgently call for strengthening the internal front there as well. They should try to build an internal front in Small South and South Kurdistan. To the extent that we can do this, we can protect our country and people in this Third War. We can also use the opportunities arising from the war to move towards statehood.
Therefore, I am not surprised by what is happening; there is no process that can be disrupted by trustees. Because there is no process that has even started. Just as after the explosion in Ankara, Bahçeli and Erdoğan said, “We will continue our way,” they will repeat the same things after these trustee appointments.
WE NEED TO SEPARATE GOVERNMENT FROM STATE LOGIC
Finally, I want to ask this: The rapprochement between the CHP and DEM Party and their recent appearance together, what kind of approach do you think it will create on the AKP side?
Here, when evaluating Turkey’s politics, we need to separate the logic of government from that of the state. Even though Erdoğan has tried to organize the government and the state in nearly the same way over the past 10 years, these two must be continuously evaluated separately. This was an all-out attack. Bahçeli insisted that “Edirne and Kandil are not the addressees of this issue,” while CHP leader Özgür Özel said, “This cannot happen without Selahattin Demirtaş.” In fact, this was a siege move against all Kurdish politics. Of course, the political disputes within Turkey continue on their own course. Whether the AKP deliberately tried to place the CHP and DEM Party in the same position and then label them as “terrorists” for the election, I’m not sure. It could be possible; Erdoğan’s and Bahçeli’s party policies might play a role in this. However, what we need to focus on is the state policy and state logic.
Interview: Qesîm Etmanekî
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