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The conference on independencys in kurdish politics

Fuat Önen

-The dominant style of politics in Kurdish politics

I also want to address independence in Kurdish politics. This is what we see in all four part of Kurdistan today. The dominant style of politics is not an independenceist, it is an autonomist or a federalist style of politics. There is not a very long history of federalist politics in Kurdistan, but more so in northern Kurdistan after the ’68s. If you ask me, there are two backgrounds to federalism in Kurdistan, the federal Kurdistan demand. One of them is communism-socialism. Kurdish organisations in northern Kurdistan, founded by socialist Kurds and aiming to revolutionise Turkey, said it could be solved with a federal Kurdistan. If I’m not mistaken, it was the Socialist Party of Kurdistan of Turkey that did it first. It is the Socialist Party of Kurdistan of Turkey that programmed the federation programmally as the target of national liberation. In terms of this socialist logic, it is understandable because it is before our eyes in the example of the Soviet Union. If you say it’s true, I’ll say it’s not true, but it’s understandable.  I think it is normal for a federalist Kurdish organization to form in the north-west of Kurdistan when there is a whole Soviet Union before our eyes in a left-socialist wave.

The second source of the federalist style of politics or the demand for federated Kurdistan is much newer. This Kurdish political movement began in the First Gulf War, and after the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, federalist demands within the national liberationist politics in Kurdistan began to make more money when central southern Kurdistan began to organize in a federal model. Today, there are many Kurdish parties presenting as a federal Kurdistan solution proposal in north west Kurdistan, eastern Kurdistan and south western Kurdistan. The autonomist demanding style of politics is much stronger and much older. In Kurdish politics, perhaps in the millennial years we have left behind, an autonomist structure has always been there in Kurdistan. Many empires, many invading powers occupied Kurdistan and devastated Kurdistan. However, this occupation has remained more of a form of external sovereignty and has not penetrated this occupation into Kurdistan’s society. And under this upper sovereignty there are institutions of sub-sovereignty, in Kurdistan. These structures are the mirlik, principality, tribal confederations that we call mirnism, and the Kurds have been able to sustain their characteristics of being Kurdish society through these sub-forms of power. For him, autonomist demand has a certain historical history in the Kurdish movement. It is possible to say that this style of politics prevailed in the pre-modern era. There are many reasons for this. One important reason is that the Kurds are people of the near east. Kurdistan is also the central country of the near east, this is not a matter of any simple naming, it is a transit zone between the near east east and the west. It’s an area where east and west fight, this is the place. The presence of strong central states in the east and west has led to the emergence of lower power demands in this geography and the tendency of the peoples living in this geography to continue their lives with sub-power mechanisms, in accordance with their national, social conditions, while accepting the upper sovereignty of the invaders. I hope we have time to discuss this.

Kurdistan is also not visible in independence. This is also the same in North West Kurdistan, and this is the same in other parts of Kurdistan. But I’d like you to note that in the last year or two there have been serious independenceist shove, especially in Central Southern Kurdistan, where Yekgûrtû Islami and Komala Islami created an independent Kurdistan project 1-2 months ago, and the 100th day of the Sykes-Picot treaty. In 2016, they said they would release this project to the world. Spokesmen for Mesut Barzani PDK, YNK and GORAN say that recently, Central Southern Kurdistan’s relationship with Iraq has turned into a Confederal relationship. This model is important, and if you ask me, Federalism will never be a permanent model for resolving the Kurdistan issue. But if there is an interstate environment that mandates living with neighboring states, the appropriate model is the Confederate model. As you know, the Confederate model also has two separate states. So here the state of Southern Kurdistan, the Iraqi state here, if these two states are asked to live together, some common work of these two states is left to an upper Confederal parliament, both separate state assets are at the fore.

I think these developments are important in South West Kurdistan.

In central Southern Kurdistan, the independenceist rhetoric has started to increase further, and only here is perhaps the important one; Yet the independenceist rhetoric has not come to the fore, because it is the right model for solving the Kurdistan issue. It is now discussed as a necessity that is more arising from the insleration of those who rule Iraq to tolerate Federal Kurdistan, but I find it important to discuss independence in Central Southern Kurdistan, even though it is also discussed.

In eastern Kurdistan, a section of the Kurds in the Iranian Parliament recently proposed to establish a province called Kurdistan, which is very interesting, which was challenged by Azerbaijani politicians before Iranian politicians. This is Azerbaijan. A province called Kurdistan cannot be established here, they objected.

We may discuss developments in South West Kurdistan if you have any questions, but I would like to say two important and positive outcomes. The PYD-YPG’s struggle there, the way they fight, their relationship, each of us can have numerous criticisms, and so do I. But there are two positive results that have led to; I find it important that the borders of South Western Kurdistan have become visible, albeit through cantons. Secondly, organisations such as DAIS and NASRA have been denied influence in Kurdistan because they have entered Kurdish areas in Aleppo, for example, and Aleppo has been tarumar. I think it’s especially important that borders become visible in terms of what we’re discussing.

Independence in Kurdistan is nothing new, you can see independence in the Ubeydullah River, you can see independence in Badirxan Pasha.

The first debate within the organization was perhaps the one that started in 1920 at the KÜRDÝSTAN THEATRICAL SOCIETY, and the K.T.C. was divided after that debate. In its place, THE INCENTIVE-I CONSTRUCTION SOCIETY was established. The people who founded this organization are the independenceist cadres within theKÜRDÝ° SOCIETY OF TURKEY.  Most of the Kurdish organisations that were later established have cadres from these two agencies. On a staff basis, we also see a continuity in independence, then there is the AZADÎ organization, then there is the XOYBÛN organization, and the program is the independent Kurdistan program.

We come after that in the 1970s and for the first time in Kurdistan, i.e. after this interruption in the 1970s we see a very serious independenceist development in North West Kurdistan. In particular, close to 10 independenceist political parties were established in North West Kurdistan after the 68-78 separate organizing-together organizing debate with the Turkish socialists. After the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK, KAWA, RÝZGARÎ, ALA RÝZGARÎ are all organizations established through an independenceist political style. This trend was a trend that lasted until 2000 in North West Kurdistan, but from 1993 to perhaps in the 2000s, independence movements became more visible and became far from visible. And if you ask me, is there no independenceist vein in North West Kurdistan, there is a very strong independenceist vein. I think it was 2009.

 Tarhan Erdem conducted a public opinion survey among Kurds in Turkey and Kurdistan, where 8.6% of those who saw the resolution of this issue in independent Kurdistan came out. This is a very serious figure of 8.6%. Every Kurdish politician and intellectual who appeared on TELEVISION said, We do not want a state. We don’t want borders. We threw away independence, he said in a political climate. I find it very important that there are 8.6% independence among Kurds, I find it very serious. These investigations were repeated later, and in a recent opinion poll conducted in Diyarbakir, the independenceist’s relative 16.8% I think it has reached that level. This is important, serious, and insensitivity is the only normal style of politics of the National Liberation Struggle. So look at the National Liberation Struggles in the world today, from Algeria to Libya, back to Vietnam, to India, in all national liberation struggles, normal style politics is independence. The program of the National Liberation Struggle is not as complex as it is said, it is very simple. We are a nation, we have a home, we will state in this country and rule ourselves. Because of this, independence is the main base in all national liberation struggles in the world. We need to discuss the reasons why this is not visible in Kurdistan to this extent, there are still discussions on this issue.

Let me try to complete it slowly.

  In principle, I think that the principle that Kurdish politics should take as its basis is the independence and unity of Kurdistan, the historical, social, political right of the Kurdish people! The permanent solution to the Kurdistan issue is in Independent United Kurdistan. I know, like everyone else, that this lasting solution can’t be a snap. Autonomous, Federal, Confederate models may also come before us for the struggle to go to this permanent solution, but if a political party is going to express itself through a permanent solution, which I think it should. The program of national liberation in Kurdistan is Independent United Kurdistan.

   Revolutionaries are people with recipes. The revolutionary movement is the recipe.

We all have to stick to our recipes in this area where they need to change, and we change them ourselves. I don’t think we should let the Turkish wave spoil our recipes.

Finally, I want to end with a word from Einstein. There’s a saying to Einstein that Einstein says, Beware of stinking compromises.

Compromise is possible in every struggle. It is also possible to reach some compromises in various periods, and sometimes this is the only rational way. We need to see if the compromise here stinks.

From my point of view, when it comes to kurdistan, every compromise of the Kurdish people that jumps over the reality of the nation country is a stinking compromise.

Kurdistan National Liberationists can only look for compromises through the acceptance of the fact that the Kurdish people are nation by nation.

I’d like to end with this and thank you all again for your attention.

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