Fuat Önen
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: You say that all political parties in Kurdistan should be fighting for the ‘independence of Kurdistan’. If we evaluate the developments in the Middle East and the relations between the Kurd parties, can we say that the Kurds can do this in this process?
Fuat Önen: The Kurdistan issue is a fragmented nation-country issue. It is the result of the post-First World War world order and the inability to include the Kurd nation in the system of the world states on which it is based. I say that the permanent solution to this problem is Independent-United Kurdistan. This is a strategic goal, and the programmes of the Kurdistan parties should focus on this goal. I’m not saying this can happen in one fell snum and without going through any intermediate stages. We can consider developments in Southern Kurdistan and Western Kurdistan (federation, canton) as examples of these intermediate stages. We need to be aware that there are workarounds, not permanent. In the south and west of Kurdistan, the war has taken on a new form. We are no longer in the phase of partisan struggle, we have to defend our territory alongside the partisan struggle (peshmerga, guerrilla warfare). In today’s world, the only political form of defending territory is nationalization. In its simplest form, you can’t have warplanes without nationalization and you can’t have interstate airlines. When you’re attacked by fighter jets, you don’t have the defense systems to protect yourself against them. The main reason for our catastrophe from Şengal to Kobani is not being able to state. That’s why we have to ask every state in the world for weapons, including the occupying states, in the face of this attack. Kurdistan politics itself should give up its love of transforming invading states into kurdish states, rather than becoming state. This is both contrary to the existential styles (ontology) of the occupying states and an effort to make the fragmentation of Kurdistan permanent. Therefore, I think that the goal of Independent Kurdistan for a permanent solution is the most realistic goal in terms of Kurdistan politics. The Kurdistan parties, which will be the actors and heirs of the world’s longest-running struggle for national liberation, must do politics with this awareness of history.
If I have to answer your question via South Kurdistan, here’s what needs to be done:
All political parties in southern Kurdistan must gather their extraordinary congresses and renew their programmes at the request of Independent Kurdistan and call on the Government and Presidency of Southern Kurdistan to carry out this request. Wanting independence is not the same as getting independence. Getting it requires a tough fight and it’s not just up to us. It depends on the balance of power in the world, in the region, and on the capacity of the invaders to sustain the occupation. Such a call by our parties strengthens the hand of the regional government and presidency, shows that there is strong popular support behind our demand for independence. Instead, if our parties still mention Sulaimaniye Province or The Canton of Sengal, it weakens our demand for independence, expands the manoeuvre field of invading states and serves occupying states to perform political operations in Southern Kurdistan. Of course, it is perfectly normal to discuss canton, autonomy or the provincial system within the administrative regime of Independent Kurdistan.
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: You criticized the Regional Government of Southern Kurdistan for ‘mercy’ on Arab refugees prior to the ISIS attacks. What kind of action could the Kurdistan Regional Government take before the ISIS attacks? And do you expect the Kurdistan Regional Government to declare independence within two years of an independence process?
Fuat Önen: There is a misunderstanding. I didn’t say the problem was compassion. I’m not talking about Arab refugees, I’m talking about Arab tribes in Sengal. After the capture of Mosul by ISIS, Peshmerga forces settled in the places where the Iraqi army withdrew. Arab tribes in the region also met with President Barzani to show allegiance. And these armed Arab tribes carried out massacres in the villages of Êzidi during the Sengal occupation of DAIs. The problem here is that a lot of definitions of the state can be made, and one important feature of being a state is that it has a monopoly on weapons and armed forces. The Government of Southern Kurdistan should have disarmed these tribes and controlled all armed forces in the region by acting with the state mind and as a state. For refugees, the accommodation of non-Kurdistan refugees outside the settlements could be considered a security measure.
More importantly, it is the weaknesses that a arise during the Sengal occupation of DAIS. Issues such as non-predicted occupation and non-taking of necessary measures should be investigated. The political responsibility of the government, the Regional President should be examined in the context of Turkey and the Coalition States. With the ingenuity of a parliamentary commission, the facts must be revealed and the responsibilities of the Perchmerge ministry, peshmerga commanders in the region, party inspectors should be accounted for.
2 months, 2years or 10 years is not going to happen. The question is if the political actors of Southern Kurdistan will show such will. We have a national government created by our five major parties in the region, but we have neither a national programme nor a national policy set by this government. In the face of every serious problem that arises in the South, our government is not taking a national stand, our parties are taking a political stand with their own party interests. This government does not have a policy of Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq. Our government has no national economic policy, no oil policy. Our government’s national army, national public order, national education policy is also not in force. One of our parties has party policies that exclude the other. This is our main problem in southern Kurdistan and this has a negative impact on the national struggle in other parts. We can declare independence to the extent that this problem is overcome. It’s not with the problem.
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: As you also know, there is currently a ‘presidential crisis’ in the Kurdistan Regional Government. Writers and politicians from all over Kurdistan assessed the developments in the Middle East and the process through which Kurdistan is going, and explained that Masoud Barzani should continue. What does it mean for Kurdistan for Masoud Barzani to continue in this process?
Fuat Önen: The calendar is cramped and southern Kurdistan is legally in danger of becoming presidentless. Therefore, it is reasonable for Masoud Barzani to remain president in the next two years. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that President Barzani is running a successful presidency, considering that even if serious progress has been made in Southern Kurdistan during the 8-year period we have left behind, our core issues are still unresolved.
Our Southern brothers put the car in front of the horse. They are discussing what kind of state regime (flare-up system, presidential system) should be, by jumping the question of what kind of state (federal, confederal, independent). Our Parliament must agree on the goal of Independence and declare it. Regime discussions should also be continued on this axis. The administrative regime of the state is determined by the balance of power in its establishment. . In this fragmentary political picture in the south, the glare system seems more reasonable.
All of our parties forming the government are important parties for kurdistan’s independence. 40 years of YNK is important. The YNK can give its due by overcoming the post-Talabani governance crisis and keeping the flag of independence high. Goran is important and it is a chance for the peshmerga ministry to be in this movement. It is goran’s responsibility in the first place to end the fragmentary peshmerga structure and build a national army. It is clear that to build a national army, you need to have the goal of a national state. It is important for Yekgırtû and Komel to be in government, it is difficult for a movement without religious people to achieve independence. The independence of Southern Kurdistan is not the independence of President Barzani or the KDP, it is the independence of 16% of our country. It is our wish that all our parties behave with this consciousness and raise the flag of independence together.
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: Since 2013, PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan called the talks between MIT-Kandil and the HDP a negotiation process, which has been publicly referred to as a solution process. If we look at the developments in the last 3 years, why did the negotiations with Ocalan end? Why did the state start bombing PKK positions again? What are the reasons for discussing the legitimacy of the HDP with the investigations against HDP Leader Selahattin Demirtas and HDP deputies?
Fuat Önen: There is also a misunderstanding here. On the contrary, I said that the Imrali process, which was re-operated in 2013, was not a negotiation process. I said that there should be two free parties to talk about a negotiation, and in Imrali, the free side is only the state. Ocalan later said that there could be no mention of a negotiation, that he had been approached as an instrument in the process so far, that he understood it, but that the negotiation process should now be move on. Currently, the PKK-HDP front’s demand is to move on to the negotiation process. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no negotiation process or peace process. In order to talk about such processes, it is a prerequisite for the parties to recognize each other. The Turkish state still does not recognize the existence of Northern Kurdistan and the reality of the Kurdistan people nation by nation. It is not true that the Ocalan-MIT negotiations in Imrali have ended. State executives and HDP executives also point out that these talks are ongoing. They are the meetings of the HDP delegation in Imrali, which has been suspended.
The ongoing Third World War in our region continues on slippery ground, and some alliances form new alliances in deterioration. The last Imrali process, which began in 2013, was intended to control the PKK through Ocalan, speed up the integration process and to do business with the PKK outside the Turkish borders (especially in Syria). The pkk’s withdrawal to the anti-Assad front was to end armed forces and activities in Turkey. Turkey’s Policy on Syria and the recent Imrali process have also collapsed. While the independence of Southern Kurdistan was on the agenda, cerablus was also brought down after the fall of Girêspî, and western Kurdistan’s territorial unity was on the agenda, while the Turkish Parliament joined the coalition states with a manoeuvre, and put figs and other facilities into the service of the coalition (USA). He declared war on DAIS, but the warplanes headed for southern Kurdistan. In Syria, the war plan against Assad, along with the spirit of Ashme, collapsed, Turkish planes began low flights over Kobani, and headed for the construction of a safe zone in Jarablus. The targets of the bombardment are to block the independence of Southern Kurdistan, to block the territorial ness of Western Kurdistan and to pacifize the resistance focus in northern Kurdistan. We can’t talk about an all-out war decision yet. For now, it is targeted to achieve the goal with a show of force and a threat. All-out war is not a possibility.
The legitimacy of the HDP is controversial in terms of Kurdistan politics. In 1968-78, the separate-together organizing debate was consumed and the Kurdistan socialists decided to organize separately. 40 years later, the HDP is an integration project as a reorganization project. Discussing its legality by the government is a tactical attack. The insurgent within the HDP is looking to pacifize the vein. This may also have a purpose of taking imrali-Kandil-Legal area relations under state control.
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: You state that the main reason for the dialogue between Turkey and Kurdler in the North is the status quo they experienced in Southern Kurdistan. In other news, pkk leaders said, We don’t want a state. Don’t you have a public response to your statements? How are the kurds’ demands to become a state blocked?
Fuat Önen: Here’s what I’m saying about this:
According to Izady’s figures, Southern Kurdistan accounted for 16% of Kurdistan and Western Kurdistan accounted for 8%, while Northern Kurdistan accounted for 42%. Independence in the part that makes up 16% of a country, Canton-Autonomy is discussed in the part that makes up 8%, and if the merger of these two parts imposes itself regardless of the will of those who run the part, the occupant of 42% understands that he cannot continue the occupation as before and sleeps away…
There is no peace process in northern Kurdistan. Turkey has a 22-year restoration process and has failed. He has a 16-year Imrali process, which is doomed to failure. The first 4 and last 6 years of this 16-year Imrali process are intended to keep the PKK under control through Ocalan and to integrate Northern Kurdistan into Turkey. TC is aware of the importance of the 20-25 years ahead for itself. He is in a hurry to prevent developments in other parts of Kurdistan from leaking over the border. If this can prevent political insist in the 20-25 year period, it is in the account that the system can masce Northern Kurdistan as East and South East Anatolia, even though kurdistan is east of its borders with its integrationalist power.
We do not want a state statements in public, and especially among the middle classes, the political class and our readers are sure to have a response. The integration mechanisms created by TC in the North over the last 20 years are strong. We know that TC is also strong in Kurd politics. Many reasons for reciprocation of anti-stateization rhetoric can be listed. A detailed response to this exceeds the limits of this roportage.
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: How do you assess the Kurdistan political parties in Northern Kurdistan, which have criticized the PKK’s declared ceasefire decision, reacting to the PKK’s decision to break fire and calling for an end to the conflict?
Fuat Önen: War is the continuation of politics through difficult means. In this sense, weapons are an add-on to politics. Breaking a truce or a truce is not something to be evaluated on its own. The politics behind this are to be evaluated. In the north, ocalan’s slogan armed struggle has filled its name was soon adopted in non-PKK political circles, and this slogan is wrong. It is not a promise that politicians of a country with hundreds of thousands of occupation troops in its country can say. Because being under occupation is already subject to a state of war. The occupation is intense and continues with a weapon. Saying that is not constantly calling for war. Armed struggle is not the only form of political struggle. It is a tool that stands out or is left behind by time. I said in 2013 that if the PKK does not see the armed struggle correctly during this period, it should gather its congress and make such a decision. However, I said that this could not be the solution to the Kurdistan issue. I told him it was wrong to reflect the imra period like this. The armed struggle must be looked at in terms of its objectives. The only goal to legitimize the armed struggle in Kurdistan is the goal of stateisation. The armed struggle in Northern Kurdistan with the goal of democratization of Turkey is wrong. The goal of the armed struggle must be to end the occupation.
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: On the other hand, it is interpreted that the attacks and criticisms from Northern Kurdistan against Southern Kurdistan Region President Mesud Barzani and PDK stem from the failures in the North. What do you attribute the main reason for these attacks?
Fuat Önen: This issue is too serious to be understood with such shallow comments. It cannot be said that the PKK has acted monolithicly on this issue. For example, those who thanked and cursed President Barzani for bringing the bodies of 13 guerrillas who were martyred in Western Kurdistan to the North are from the same circle. Again, President Barzani’s own declaration has been proven to be on the same side as Öcalan in the İmralı process. We also know that a part of the PDK has a similar attitude with the PKK media in opposition to PDK and Barzani. In short, I will try to list the reasons under 3 sub-titles.
1- In Kurdistan, the demand for central power is weak and the demand for sub-power is strong. The main reason why internal conflicts get ahead of the national liberation struggle is this sub-government passion. The most important reason for the PDK-PDK conflict, PDK-PKK, PDK-PKK and other internal conflicts, which lasted 40 years, is not demanding central power and fighting for sub-government internally. The relevance of this to being in the Near-East is a subject of separate discussion.
2-Occupying and being ruled by 4 states instead of one has expanded the maneuvering area of these states within us. The lack of centralized power demand is a factor that prevents bridges from being built with the occupying states. The bridges established with the occupying states have led to our internal conflicts. It has been understood in some PKK media that the attacks, which exceed the criteria of fairness and morality, are not independent of the intelligence organizations of the occupying states.
3- The lack of common national political goals, narrow partisan and narrow partisan understandings exacerbate political conflicts within and between parts. In this sense, the PDK’s designing the independence of Southern Kurdistan through Turkey is a serious mistake.
Mehmet Salih Batırhan: If we consider the political crisis between TEV-DEM and ENKS in Rojava, and the detentions of ENKS members, what kind of political future awaits the Kurds in Rojava?
Fuat Önen: ENKS misread the Syria and Western Kurdistan process. It assumed that the unarmed Syrian opposition would be successful, opposed the armed struggle and almost abandoned the region to the PYD-YPG. If war is imposed on you and all parties are armed and belligerent, trying to avoid war is suicidal. Now he says that he has 4-5 thousand armed peshmerga in Southern Kurdistan and wants to return and fight. This is a just demand and the PYD-YPG should not prevent it. The PYD-YPG and indeed the PKK do not demand central power in any part of Kurdistan, they demand regional sub-power under the central power. The name of this demand is sometimes autonomy, sometimes canton and sometimes democratization. It does not want to share this sub-power with any Kurdish side. For this reason, those who do not mind in alliance with Burkan al-Firat in Kobani, groups affiliated with the FSA in Afrin, regime forces in Cizre and even with the Lebanese Hezbollah avoid alliances with other Kurdish forces. This attitude shows that the word “democratic”, which does not fall into their language, does not include the Kurds, but is produced for Arabs, Persians and Turks.
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