Fuat Önen 2025-12-21
In recent years (and essentially also in official historiography), there has been increasing discussion of Kurdish–Turkish relations. Some say that Kurds and Turks are brothers. Some argue that Kurds and Turks have been allies for a thousand years, and this alliance has enabled both to remain strong.
However, no one discusses the Turkish state, nor does anyone mention Kurdistan. As if there were no state, as if there were no Kurdish homeland; as if on one side there were Kurds and on the other side Turks, and only their brotherhood and alliance are discussed. Turkish–Kurdish relations are defined as if there were only Turks and Kurds on the stage.
To discuss Kurdish–Turkish relations effectively, one must also consider the historical context of the Eastern Roman Empire and Byzantium. One must also examine the Safavid state in relation to the Sasanians. Then one must also discuss the Islamic states of the Umayyads and Abbasids. That is, Kurds and Turks, isolated by themselves from the world, do not constitute a relationship either between Kurds and Turks or between them and other peoples.
Today, I will attempt to define the relations between the Turkish state and Kurdistan from an independentist perspective. For two reasons, I will begin with the Ottoman period. The first reason is that the Republic of Turkey is a continuation of the Ottoman Empire. In essence, the Ottoman Empire itself is a continuation of Byzantium. The second reason is that a lasting relationship between the Turkish states and Kurdistan began in the Ottoman period.
In 1514, the Treaty of Amasya was signed. One side of this treaty is the Ottoman Empire, and the other side consists of some Kurdish principalities of Kurdistan. That is, a relationship does not arise between two people. A relationship develops between the Ottoman Empire and certain Kurdish principalities in the Kurdistan region.
When Erdoğan, Bahçeli, and Öcalan discuss Kurdish–Turkish relations, they often begin with Melazgirt. Öcalan says that there has been a thousand-year Kurdish–Turkish alliance. Bahçeli and Erdoğan, in recent years, have also spoken of thousand-year-old Kurdish–Turkish relations, basing their claims on the Battle of Malazgirt. They say that from that time until today, Kurds and Turks have been brothers, collaborators, and allies.
The Battle of Melazgirt was a pivotal battle that took place between the Seljuk state and the Byzantines at Melazgirt. Some Kurdish principalities participated in this battle, such as the Rawadis and the Shaddadis. The ruler of the Marwanids was taken hostage. As a result, some Marwanid fighters also participated in this battle. But in this battle, there was no alliance between Kurds and Turks. The owners of the war were the Seljuks and the Byzantines. Some Kurdish rulers assisted the Seljuks in this battle. But this relationship was not a lasting one.
After the Battle of Malazgirt, Alp Arslan did not go westward. On the contrary, he turned eastward and went to fight the Karakhanids. About a year and a half after the Battle of Malazgirt, Alp Arslan was killed during the siege of a fortress. We do not debate here whether the Seljuks were Turks or not Turks. But no lasting relationship remained from that war onward.
From the 11th century to the 16th century, the relations between certain Kurdish principalities in Kurdistan and certain states referred to as Turkish states were not relations with the Ottoman Empire, which was not established until the 13th century. That is, states like the Aq Qoyunlu, Qara Qoyunlu, and Artuqids before the Ottomans. In that six-hundred-year period, there was no lasting relationship between Kurdistan and these states. These were conjunctural and temporary relations. That is, some Kurdish rulers allied with the Aq Qoyunlu, some allied with the Qara Qoyunlu. In the east, there was the Iranian state. Some Kurdish rulers cooperated with them. And very often there were wars between the Kurdish principalities and these states, which, if you ask me, were like bandit states, migrating from Central Asia and establishing states for themselves on other people’s land.
In this six-hundred-year period, there was no lasting relationship between Kurdistan and the Ottoman state or these other states. The relationships were conjunctural. Depending on which side was stronger in the war, some Kurdish rulers aligned with them, while others sided with the opposing forces. From this, no Kurdish–Turkish relationship emerges.
However, following the Amasya Agreement of 1514 and its subsequent continuation, a lasting relationship was established between the Ottoman state and the Kurdish principalities of Kurdistan. This does not immediately take shape with the Battle of Chaldiran. The Chaldiran that is spoken of is not the Chaldiran of Van. The Chaldiran Plain is a vast expanse of land. Today, it lies within the borders of the city of Maku, on the border of the Iranian state and Eastern Kurdistan.
In that battle as well, not all Kurdish principalities were on the Ottoman side. Some Kurdish principalities fought alongside the Ottomans against the Safavids. Four years before this battle, in 1510, ten Kurdish rulers aligned themselves with the Safavid Shah. The Safavid Shah welcomed them, then imprisoned them all. The Safavids sought to rule all of Kurdistan directly, rather than through Kurdish rulers. They wanted to appoint beys and rulers from Tabriz and govern Kurdistan through them.
The Ottoman policy realized that they could not rule Kurdistan directly. They said we will rule Kurdistan through its rulers. The basis of this agreement consists of two points. In war, the Kurdish rulers will assist the Ottoman state. And the Ottoman state will in no way interfere in the internal relations of the Kurdish principalities. Each ruler is an autonomous state according to that agreement.
After the Battle of Chaldiran, war between the Ottomans and the Safavids continued for nearly forty years. In 1555, the treaty was again known as the Treaty of Amasya. The Safavids and the Ottomans ended the war and signed a treaty. But it did not end there. The battle between these two empires continued in Kurdistan. Diyarbakir was in Safavid hands. The principality of Botan was in Safavid hands. Then, wars were waged to remove these principalities from Safavid rule and place them under Ottoman sovereignty.
In 1639, that is, 125 years after the Battle of Chaldiran, the Safavid and Ottoman states reached an agreement. Two-thirds of Kurdistan came under Ottoman sovereignty, while one-third remained under Safavid sovereignty.
When we examine this today, there is no equal alliance to be found here. There is no brotherhood here. The Kurdish principalities, numbering between twenty and twenty-four, accepted Ottoman sovereignty for the next 125 years. The Ottomans thus became the sovereign power over Kurdistan. In return, rulership passed from father to son; if a ruler died, his sons or his brothers succeeded him. The Ottoman state did not interfere.
In my view, two-thirds of the land of Kurdistan was conquered by the Ottoman state. This was not an alliance of the heart, nor a natural alliance, nor a coalition of brotherhood. The first conquest of Kurdistan by the Ottomans occurred during these 125 years.
The Ottomans thus became sovereign over two-thirds of Kurdistan’s land. When we say ‘conquest’ today, some friends argue that ‘conquest’ is an Islamic term and has a positive connotation. That is not so. Conquest existed even before Islam. It originates from the Arabic verb fataha, meaning “to enter” or “to open.” The Qur’an itself begins with Surah al-Fatiha, that is, with “the opening.”
This was an occupation. The relationship between the Ottoman state and Kurdistan was not one of equality. The sovereign was the Ottoman state, and it can be said that two-thirds of Kurdistan was annexed.
There is nothing that we can praise and say that Kurds and Turks together built a state out of brotherhood. The result of this war was that the Ottoman state expanded eastward, both into the Near East and the Middle East.
Kurdistan is the central land of the Near East. An empire that wants to pass into the Middle East must pass through Kurdistan. Following this alliance, the Ottoman state emerged as a significant power in the Middle East and the Near East. Until then, the Ottoman state was essentially a Western state, a continuation of the Byzantine Empire. Through Kurdistan, it reached the Middle East.
What did the Kurds gain? First, the border of the two states divided Kurdistan into two parts. Two-thirds became the property of the Ottomans, and one-third became the property of the Safavids. From this, neither brotherhood nor alliance emerges.
This alliance lasted about 300 years. During these 300 years, numerous conflicts arose between the Kurdish principalities and Ottoman forces. However, we can say that during these 300 years, the agreement was effective. When was this agreement abandoned? In the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire recognized that it was weakening among the world’s empires.
They searched for solutions. The first solution they found was that they needed to modernize their army. The Nizam-i Cedid was part of this attempt. That is, they would abandon the Janissaries and build a modern army. Its continuation in the 19th century was the Sekban-i Cedid. When a state seeks to modernize itself, it concentrates authority in a single location.
All empires in the world are non-centralized states. In recent years, there has been considerable discussion about decentralization; however, empires are inherently decentralized. For this reason, when considering the Ottoman state, which spanned from North Africa to Asia and the Balkans, it controlled a vast territory. They could not govern this territory from their capital alone. Therefore, they were forced to maintain regional and autonomous authorities.
When a state wants to modernize, it must abolish these regional and autonomous authorities and concentrate power in the capital.
This is now the period of colonization. The process of colonizing Ottoman Kurdistan began in the early 18th century and lasted 117 years. In 1730, an institution called Ma’dini Humayun was established to extract silver, gold, and other minerals. This was a colonial institution with great authority. It could force people to work, open courts, drag local people into courts, and punish them. Its sphere of authority extended from Palu to Ergani. From Ergani to Dersim, entire forests could be cut down, and people were forced to transport the timber to the mining areas. The governments of Palu and Kigi, along with the local tribes, rose against this colonial oppression. Many fierce wars occurred between the Ottoman state and regional fighters. The Ottoman state established a new authority in the region, backed by a significant military presence.
After fifty years of war, the Ottoman state broke the sovereignty of tribal confederations and local Kurdish governments over the colonial institution called Ma’dini Humayun. During the period of the Turkish Republic, institutions such as the General Inspectorates and the declaration of emergency rule in Kurdistan are rooted in this history.
THE PERIOD OF COLONIZATION
This is the period of colonization. For this reason, from 1817 until 1947, Kurdistan was a zone of war. This war is between the Ottoman state and the Kurdish principalities.
The Ottoman state says, ‘I will appoint governors over you.’ My governors will govern you. The Kurdish rulers say: according to the Amasya Agreement, we are autonomous. And the administrator of the principality can be appointed within the borders of the principality. For this reason, a thirty-year war continues. There were the uprisings of Mir Muhammad of Rawanduz, Khan Mahmud, and finally, the uprising of the ruler of Botan, Bedirxan Beg.
During these thirty years, the Ottoman state reconquered Kurdistan. Because during these thirty years of war, the Ottoman state did not have authority in Kurdistan. Every part of Kurdistan is embroiled in conflict. Some Ottoman historians also consider 1847 to be the second conquest of Kurdistan. This conquest is an occupation. Now the Ottoman state wants to govern Kurdistan directly. Through Ottoman governors, they want to rule Kurdistan directly.
In 1847, the Ottoman state established a province named Kurdistan. Its borders are not clearly defined; from Cizre to Diyarbakir and eastward, a province called Kurdistan is declared.
Why is it declared? Because Kurdish rulers no longer hold authority in Kurdistan. To govern Kurdistan through governors, a province named Kurdistan is established. We can define this relationship as the “colonization of Kurdistan.” And now the Ottoman state wants to govern Kurdistan directly from Istanbul.
However, something unexpected emerges. Until that time, in what is known as Ottoman Kurdistan, there were approximately twenty Kurdish governments. These are of different types. Some are Kurdish governments, some are sanjaks. Their statuses differ. But instead of twenty Kurdish governments, thousands of tribes emerge. These tribes both fight among themselves and fight the Ottoman governors.
A great political chaos arises in Kurdistan. That is, when you leave Kurdistan without status and abolish all the statuses of the principalities, political chaos begins. For this reason, the Ottoman state searches for solutions.
In the 19th century, the emergence of influential sheikhs and the strengthening of religious orders were observed in Kurdistan. In essence, there are two major orders in Kurdistan. One is Qadiri, the other is Naqshbandi. And there are three essential madrasas in Kurdistan: the Barzan madrasa, the Nehri madrasa, and the Barzinji madrasa.
The Ottoman state aims to establish order in Kurdistan through these decrees. It supports the sheikhs and their orders, strengthening them. But again, something unexpected emerges. In my view, for the first time in Kurdistan, informal organizations emerge through these orders.
When there were principalities, each principality organized itself within its borders. Military, economic, political, and social organizations existed within the principality’s borders. When the orders became widespread, such as the Naqshbandi sheiks, Nehri and Barzan, and the Qadiri sheikhs, Barzinji, the organization expanded.
The Nehri order does not remain limited to the mountains of Hakkari. It organizes itself throughout Kurdistan. Now, those who are organized are not limited to principality borders; new organizations emerge among the masses of Kurdistan.
The Ottomans were not expecting this. They also did not calculate one more thing. They did not see that these madrasas had become sources of nationalism. In the madrasas, the Qur’an is read in Arabic. But jurisprudential books and all discussions are conducted in Kurdish. This also brings national consciousness.
In these madrasas, Ahmad Khani is recited, Feqiye Teyran is recited, and Melaye Ciziri is recited. And these now spread not only within the principality’s borders, but throughout Kurdistan.
As a result of this organization and awakening, in the 1880s, the uprising of Sheikh Ubaydullah of Nehri broke out. This uprising is essential. In modern Kurdish history, for the first time, the goal of this uprising is an independent and united Kurdistan. Sheikh Ubaydullah writes in his letter that today the Ottomans are weak; if we were to attack them, we could defeat them. However, we would first attack the Safavids, seize Azerbaijan and its wealth, and then turn our attention to the Ottomans.
That is, the perspective of this uprising is an independent and united Kurdistan. For this reason, historians consider this uprising to be the beginning of the national liberation struggle.
This uprising is also crushed. The issue of governance in Kurdistan remains unresolved for the Ottoman state. They say we will govern Kurdistan through sheikhs and orders. All three madrasas become centers of uprisings.
As you are aware, an uprising led by Sheikh Abdulselam Barzani occurred at the beginning of the 20th century. After that, there is the uprising of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji. All of these organized Society through these madrasas and then revolted.
The Ottoman state again turns to the tribes to govern Kurdistan. They establish the Hamidiye Regiments. In 1891, the Hamidiye Regiments were established.
Both Turkish writers and some Kurdish writers define the Hamidiye Regiments as units established against Armenians. In my view, this interpretation is mistaken.
Yes, the Hamidiye Regiments were indeed used against Armenians and later against Russians; however, the primary reason for establishing the Hamidiye Regiments was to govern Kurdistan. These regiments were established to enable the Ottoman state to govern Kurdistan through them.
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Regarding the First World War, as you know, although official Turkish history is not entirely honest, whenever Turkish politicians feel cornered, they say that Kurds and Turks built this state together. They say Kurds and Turks fought together at Gallipoli. Sometimes they say they fought imperialism.
The First World War was a war among imperialist powers. Both sides were imperialist. That is, Britain, France, and Russia formed an imperialist front, while Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire also formed an imperialist front. This was not a religious war. Although the Ottomans used the caliphate, presenting themselves as caliphs and calling for jihad, they drew the entire Ottoman population into the war.
In this war, there were no martyrs. Millions of people died. Millions were killed according to the interests of imperialist states because the Ottomans’ allies were Austria-Hungary and Prussia, who were not Muslim.
In this war, especially at Gallipoli, the Ottoman army was commanded by a Jewish German officer. He was the commander; Mustafa Kemal was beside him, guarding a trench.
For this reason, the stories about the “spirit of Gallipoli” bringing Kurds and Turks together again lack such a spirit. This was an imperialist spirit. Kurds participated in this war. Many Kurds were killed on many fronts. But not voluntarily. They were Ottoman subjects; the Ottomans ordered them to go to war, and they were forced to go.
Even today, when the Turkish state enters a war, there are many Kurds within the Turkish army. They are forced to fight. From this war, neither the brotherhood of peoples nor an anti-imperialist spirit emerged because the states fighting were all imperialist states.
Here I open a parenthesis on imperialism. The words “imperialism” and “empire” come from the same root. The root is Latin. Empire and imperialism come from the same root.
The word imperialist existed before capitalism. Every empire is an imperialist state. However, during the First World War, Hilferding, Bukharin, and later Lenin argued that this stage of capitalism, characterized by the domination of financial capital and imperialism, was in fact monopoly capitalism.
Therefore, the old meaning of imperialism gradually disappeared. Instead, before the era of monopoly capitalism, the concept of colonialism emerged.
However, I use the concept of imperialism in both meanings. That is, during the First World War, there was no financial capital dominance in the Ottoman state, nor in Russia, nor in Austria-Hungary.
But Lenin nevertheless defined this war as a war of imperialist states for the division of the world. That is, the Ottomans were also an imperialist state like the others. The First World War produced an unexpected outcome with the October Revolution. If it had not been for the October Revolution, the victors of this war would have eliminated Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman state.
But after the October Revolution, Russia emerged as a victorious state. Yet the Bolsheviks said that they rejected all the promises made to them during the imperialist war. They disclosed secret treaties, including the Sykes–Picot Agreement, and even signed a pact with the Ottomans, telling them they would pay war reparations. You saw how the war victors then became targets of Britain and France. The balance of power was redesigned. Britain, France, and Russia allied. After the October Revolution, Britain and France became enemies of the Soviets.
The Ottomans collapsed in this war. Like their other allies, they were forced to pay the price of defeat. Austria-Hungary lost all its colonies and was divided into two separate states. Prussia lost all its colonies; Germany’s colonies were subsequently passed into the hands of France and the United Kingdom. Without the October Revolution, Germany would have been partitioned.
The war then changed direction. War began between France, Britain, America, and the Soviet Union. Germany was eliminated easily. The Ottomans had already lost many lands under their sovereignty. There was the Armistice of Mudros. The British entered their capital. And the victorious states imposed their conditions on the Ottomans, just as they had done to Prussia and Austria-Hungary.
After the Armistice of Mudros and the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference, Britain and France’s main target became the Soviet Union. In 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed. In the Treaty of Sèvres, an independent Armenian state was established, encompassing the six provinces of historic Armenia, not Kurdistan. For Kurdistan, it was said that an autonomous region would be drawn south of Armenia. After one year, if the Kurds wanted it and if the League of Nations was convinced that the Kurds could govern themselves, the Ottomans could not object. Kurds could secede. This clause existed in the Treaty of Sèvres.
The Treaty of Sèvres opened the door to something new. Kurds and Armenians were set against each other. The Kurds referred to the land as Kurdistan, while the Armenians referred to it as Western Armenia.
Mustafa Kemal and Kazım Karabekir used the Armenian issue as a lever against the Kurds. There is a letter from Mustafa Kemal to Kazım Karabekir in which he says. Wherever you go, raise the Armenian issue and say that if we collapse, European states will impose the Armenian Genocide on you and all your land will become Armenia.
This is important because it caused many Kurdish tribes to side with the Turks, that is, with the National Forces (Kuva-yi Milliye). At the Sivas Congress and the Erzurum Congress, new agreements were signed. This was the main reason.
THERE WAS NO TURKISH NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR
Today, Turks speak of a national liberation war. They say that from 1919 to 1923, they waged a national liberation war. They even claim that the first national liberation war in the world was waged under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. There was no national liberation war. The cadres of the National Forces were cadres of the Committee of Union and Progress.
Those who led this movement were all Ottoman pashas. And all of them had waged an imperialist war during World War I. They themselves were imperialists. How can imperialist generals suddenly become leaders of a national liberation war?
Nothing extraordinary happened. Prussia was small, too, but it did not claim to have waged a national liberation war. Austria-Hungary did not either. You entered a great war, you lost, and you pay the price. The entire effort of the Kemalists and the National Forces was aimed at minimizing the cost of defeat.
They lost the Balkans. They lost the Middle East. What remained in their hands was Northern and Western Kurdistan. Around the Black Sea, there was the Pontus state. In the eastern Black Sea, there was the Laz principality. Their entire effort was aimed at reducing their losses.
In essence, Mustafa Kemal was also a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, albeit a secondary one. His name was not mentioned alongside Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha.
But after Enver and Talat were killed, especially when Talat fled abroad, he told his cadres to work with Mustafa Kemal. They thought Mustafa Kemal was not equal to them and that they could later retake leadership. But after they were killed, Mustafa Kemal came to the forefront.
THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE AND THE THIRD CONQUEST OF KURDISTAN
From 1919 to 1923, neither the Istanbul government nor the Ankara government had sovereignty over Kurdistan.
They had no force capable of governing the Kurdistan region. During those four years, there was not a single sheikh or tribal leader in Kurdistan whom Mustafa Kemal did not visit. Those sheikhs and tribal leaders whom Mustafa Kemal visited were, after 1923, either executed or exiled.
Because they were not sovereign in Kurdistan, Kurdish tribal leaders and landlords supported them. Lausanne marks a new phase in relations between the Turkish state and Kurdistan. We can refer to this as the third reconquest of Kurdistan.
The Republic of Turkey is the continuation of the empire, but it is no longer an empire. They wanted to build a modern state, a nation-state.
They had a state, but they had no nation. The positions of Kurds and Turks were opposite. They had a state but no nation; we had a nation but no state.
What do you do if you have a state but no nation? You must build a nation. This is called “nation-building.”
The Republic of Turkey was the instrument of this project. They wanted to build a new nation. But the geography they controlled was multinational and multi-homeland. To make a nation on such a geography, you must eliminate existing nations and erase the reality of existing homelands. This is a genocidal act.
The Turkish ruling system implemented a genocidal project through the Republic. For a hundred years, they have tried to build a nation.
Apart from Kurdistan, Armenians were already eliminated in 1915. Greeks were expelled in 1923 through population exchange; more than two million Greeks were sent to Greece.
Then came the Laz. Ask a Turk today who the Laz are, and they will say they are Turks who speak a dialect on the Black Sea. But the Laz are a separate people with their own homeland. They were also erased.
What remained was the Kurdish nation and the region of Kurdistan. For a hundred years, what this state has done in Kurdistan has been genocidal.
IN KURDISH POLITICS: INDEPENDENTISM AND AUTONOMISM
Within the Kurdish movement from 1920 to 1945, all Kurdish organizations were independentist in nature. This began with the Treaty of Sèvres. Within the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan, debates began.
As a result of these debates, the Bedirxanis and independentist intellectuals left the Society and founded the Social Organization Society in 1920. This was an independentist organization.
From 1920 to 1945, modern Kurdish parties emerged. They had modern programs. All were independentists.
In Northern and Western Kurdistan, the Social Organization Society was an independentist organization. Two years later, the Independence Committee, also known as the Azadi Organization, emerged. It was independentist.
Later, Xoybun was founded. Xoybun was an independentist. On Mount Ararat, the Republic of Kurdistan was declared. A parliament was established. Its president was not Ihsan Nuri Pasha but Heskê Têlî’s brother. Ihsan Nuri was the military commander.
In Eastern Kurdistan, Komala Jiyaneweyî Kurdistan (Komala Jêkaf) was an independentist organization. In Southern Kurdistan, Komala Hevî was independentist.
After 1945, independentist organizations disappeared, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party was founded. Autonomist lines became dominant.
Independentism means aiming for the unity of Kurdistan. Autonomism means accepting existing state borders and seeking rights within them.
Until 1945, Kurds rejected the partition of Kurdistan. Despite state borders, Kurdistan remained united in its mind.
After 1945, it became clear that a new world order had emerged, one that did not recognize Kurdish statehood. Thus, autonomist politics became dominant.
This approach dominated Kurdish politics for 45 years. Only in Northern Kurdistan after the 1970s did new organizations again programmatically adopt independent and united Kurdistan as their goal.
In the 1990s, the movement for independence in Northern Kurdistan experienced a decline. Southern Kurdistan transitioned from autonomy to federation and held an independence referendum in 2017.
Northern Kurdish politics have abandoned first unity, then independence, and now even the concept of Kurdistan itself.
Yet I repeat: for a national liberation struggle, the standard political line is independentism. We are a nation, we have a homeland, and this nation must become a state.
RELIGIOUS DIVISION
There are internal divisions in Kurdistan that independentists must understand and manage well. One is a religious division; the other is a dialectical division.
Occupying states exploit these divisions. They say Zazas are not Kurds. They apply the same policy toward Alevis and Yazidis.
During the Amasya Agreement, a rupture occurred between Muslim and non-Muslim Kurds. Non-Muslim Kurds accepted Muslim Kurds as allies of an Islamic state.
The spread of religious orders also deepened divisions. The Hamidiye Regiments excluded Alevis.
These divisions led to failures in uprisings such as the Koçgiri (1920–21), Sheikh Said (1925), and Dersim rebellions.
If we want an independent state, we must fight the occupying states and unite our Society. Otherwise, occupiers will always exploit these divisions.
THE BAHÇELI–ÖCALAN PROCESS
A process has begun in Turkey called the Bahçeli–Öcalan process. It started over a year ago, though its roots are older. Bahçeli declared that global changes pose a threat to Turkey’s survival.
Turkey fears change because it is a product of the imperial world system. The collapse of the Soviet Union intensified this fear.
They now speak of a “terror-free Turkey.” We also want no terror. But first, we want a terror-free Kurdistan.
The source of terror in Kurdistan is the presence of four occupying states. As long as occupation exists, terror will not end.
Peace requires recognition: recognition of Kurdistan and the Kurdish nation. Without this, calls for peace are calls for surrender.
Democratic Society is an empty concept. No society can be fully democratic as long as class divisions persist.
Öcalan speaks of a contradiction between the commune and the state. However, in communist theory, the contradiction lies between classes, not between the commune and the state.
Öcalan is not against existing states. He is against a future Kurdish state. His rhetoric serves to deny the necessity of Kurdish statehood.
This process is not peaceful; it is a comprehensive attack on Kurdistan. The goal is to dismantle Rojava and later South Kurdistan.
We must expose this process, organize ourselves, and build independent revolutionary organizations.
THE WORD “INTEGRATION”
Integration means assimilation. There is no integration between nations. To speak of integration between nations means dissolving one nation into another.
This is the real demand behind integration.
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