Bayram Bozyel November 22, 2025 – 09:31
“The essential point that must be taken into account regarding Syria’s future is the country’s multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural sociological and political structure. Insisting on a monolithic and centralized system in Syria would mean a repetition of the past.”
The Kurds have a traumatic history that the interventions and betrayals of great powers have damaged.
In the political equation that emerged when the Soviet Union entered Iran during the Second World War, the Mahabad Kurdish Republic, founded in 1946, was destroyed bloodily by Iranian forces the same year when the Soviet Union withdrew from the country. The Kurds held the Soviets primarily responsible for the destruction of the first and fragile republic they had established. For the execution of their leader, Qazi Muhammad, they never forgot what the Soviets had done.
After the collapse of the March 11, 1970 Autonomy Agreement with Iraq, Mustafa Barzani, who had fought against the Iraqi Ba’ath regime with the support of the U.S. and Iran, was left in the lurch following the signing of the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1975. Millions of Kurds abandoned their homes, and the Ba’ath regime brutally massacred those who remained. The Kurdish people never forgave this sudden reversal by the U.S. and Iran, and they recorded the Algiers Agreement in their collective memory as an agreement of betrayal.
The October 25, 2017, Kurdistan Independence Referendum was nothing but a peaceful and democratic expression of the Kurds’ will. The response of the U.S. and Western powers was to unleash forces such as the Hashd al-Shaabi, opening the door for the occupation of Kirkuk and other Kurdish regions. Suddenly, all doors were closed on the Kurds; they were threatened with starvation. Yet in the war against ISIS, the Peshmerga had given tens of thousands of martyrs not only for their own people but also on behalf of American and European citizens. The occupation of Kirkuk created a deep trauma within Kurdish society.
In recent years, Turkey carried out three primary operations in the Syrian Kurdish region; the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations were carried out with Russia’s approval, while the Peace Spring Operation was implemented with the consent of the U.S. For each of these military operations, the Kurds directed more anger towards the U.S. and Russia than towards Turkey.
The old regime in Syria has changed, but…
After the domino effect of developments following October 7, the old regime collapsed on December 8, 2024. With the approval of the U.S. and its allies and the encouragement of Turkey, the radical organisation Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) came and settled in Damascus. Turkey’s support for HTS certainly has ideological and religious motivations. The U.S., on the other hand, sees HTS as a balancing element against Iran and the Axis of Resistance, and because there is no alternative, it is trying to use HTS to stabilise Syria.
HTS is the last organisation to which a destroyed and fragmented country like Syria should be handed over. A structure distant from democratic mentality and lacking the will to embrace the country’s pluralistic composition is a handicap for Syria. Leaving aside HTS’s record and actions, its stance on the new constitution cannot transcend an Arab nationalist and Islamic law perspective. The massacres committed by the new regime against Alawites on the Mediterranean coast and the Druze communities in the south weaken HTS’s credibility in the construction of a new Syria.
On the other hand, the relevant actors have set aside the dilemmas arising from HTS. They are focusing instead on how to integrate the Kurds and the SDF—whose political, military, and cultural strengths give them high potential to contribute to the founding of a democratic Syria—into the current administration.
From the beginning, Turkey has pushed at every opportunity for the dissolution of the SDF and its immediate participation in the temporary administration in Damascus. Similarly, the American administration has been making intensive efforts to integrate the SDF into the Damascus area.
Not long ago, statements made by U.S. Syria representative Tom Barrack concerning Syrian Kurds—as if speaking with Ankara’s voice—created a significant backlash among Kurds.
Most recently, the meeting between U.S. President Trump and HTS leader Ahmad Shara at the White House on November 2, and the participation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in one stage of the meeting, rekindled familiar anxieties within the Kurdish community. What was happening? Was the U.S. once again selling out the Kurds?
The U.S. is allocating roles.
It is widely accepted that the top priority in U.S. Middle East policy is Israel’s security. In this context, what Trump did during the White House talks was to encourage the Damascus administration, headed by Ahmad Shara, to reconcile with Israel. The temporary Syrian administration may not join the Abraham Accords today, but it is already willing to maintain good relations with Israel.
A second U.S. objective is to integrate Syria into the coalition against ISIS. In exchange for the legitimacy it will gain from the U.S., the new administration has no choice but to say yes to this project. Syria’s participation in the coalition against ISIS is also a positive step in creating common ground between the SDF and the Damascus administration.
The U.S. and Western powers are encouraging Shara to stabilise Syria by lifting sanctions. However, they repeatedly emphasise that they will monitor the administration’s actions and that the credit they extend is limited and conditional. It is understood that Shara is to be domesticated and managed over time.
One of the U.S. objectives is also to create a centralized administration in Syria. In this context, the integration of the SDF into the central administration is a major agenda topic.
Integration into the central army does not mean the dissolution of the SDF or the absorption of its fighters into the central army on an individual basis. In terms of discipline, training, and technological equipment, the SDF is a leading military force in Syria. It appears indispensable both in the fight against ISIS and in the defence of the newly forming Syria. Dissolving the SDF would disrupt the fight against ISIS and weaken Syria’s defence. Therefore, the form of integration envisaged by Turkey—dissolving itself and joining the central army—is neither realistic nor beneficial for Syria.
Within the framework of the U.S. vision for a new Syria, inviting Hakan Fidan to the Trump–Shara meeting in New York has meaning. In this way, the U.S. is assigning Turkey a role in the process of rebuilding Syria and simultaneously drawing clear limits to that role: Turkey will not come into confrontation with Israel in Syria, it will accompany Syria’s joining of the coalition against ISIS, and it will bear responsibilities in the SDF’s integration into the Damascus administration.
In short, the U.S. does not want conflict in Syria. It is trying to reconcile HTS with Israel, Israel with Turkey, the SDF with HTS, and Turkey with the SDF, aligning everyone around its defined goals.
Realities on the ground and stability
After Russia’s withdrawal from the region and the heavy blow Iran suffered, the U.S. is now unmatched in Syria—but not alone. Alongside the U.S., Israel, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the European troika of France, the U.K., and Germany operate in the Syrian arena.
The real agenda in Washington is not so much Syria’s unitary structure as the arrangement of the Syrian pillar of the new Israel-centered regional architecture. With this latest move, Trump has partially included Turkey in the process and has brought existing actors in Syria closer together, softening the ground for conflict.
The fundamental point that must be taken into account regarding Syria’s future is the country’s multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural sociological and political structure. Insisting on a monolithic and centralized system in Syria would mean a repetition of the past. Handing Syria solely to Sunni Arabs, and particularly to their most radical religious segments, would not bring stability. A regime that excludes Alawites, Druze, and Christians of different faiths—who constitute a large part of society—cannot be democratic. The Kurdish community is a key actor in the construction of stability and democracy in both the Middle East and Syria. The political, cultural, and military consolidation of the Kurds in Rojava presents a significant opportunity for Syria’s recovery. No one has the luxury of ignoring this fact. The country’s social reality and its search for democracy and stability necessitate a pluralistic, democratic, and federal system in Syria.
The Kurds’ eyes and ears are on Rojava.
In Syria, the Kurds were excluded for many years, their identity erased, and they suffered great oppression. The ISIS barbarians who emerged in 2014 targeted the Kurds first. In response, the Kurds gave tens of thousands of martyrs in eliminating the ISIS threat and paid a heavy price. After the fall of the Assad regime, a new hope has now emerged for both the Kurds and the rest of Syria. The hope for a free, democratic, and dignified life is now closer than it has been in the past.
All Kurds around the world have their eyes and ears on Rojava. With their hearts in their mouths, they closely watch what is happening in Syria. Anything that could darken the hope for freedom appearing there unsettles them. They go to sleep with Rojava and wake up with Rojava. Their greatest fear is suffering a new betrayal. Under this sky, they want their brothers and sisters in Rojava to have a piece of homeland where they can live freely.
Because they regard Rojava as a matter of dignity.
Bayram Bozyel
Chairman of PSK
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